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  Abstract 
This paper provides further empirical results on the relationship between black 
market and official exchange rates in six emerging economies (Iran, India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Pakistan, and Thailand). First, it applies both time series techniques and 
heterogeneous panel methods to test for the existence of a long-run relation between 
these two types of exchange rates. Second, it tests formally the validity of the 
proportionality restriction implying a constant black-market premium. Third, in 
addition to the long-run equilibrium, it also analyses the short-run dynamic responses 
of both markets to shocks. Evidence of market inefficiency and incomplete (or long-
lived) reversion to long-run equilibrium is found. This implies that financial 
managers can only partially reduce the exchange rate risk, whilst monetary 
authorities can effectively pursue their policy objectives by imposing foreign 
exchange or direct controls. 
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1. Introduction 
Black markets for foreign currency develop mainly as a result of government 
restrictions on capital outflows. These induce domestic residents to seek alternative 
sources of foreign currency. Its supply generally comes from domestic residents 
connected with the tourist industry, while demand originates mainly from residents 
travelling abroad on holiday or to study. Since demand for foreign currency normally 
exceeds supply, suppliers are able to charge a higher price than the official rate. The 
difference between the black market (or parallel) exchange rate and the official rate is 
known as the black-market premium. 
 As argued in Kiguel and O`Connell (1995), a significant spread between black 
market and official rate may be a signal of macroeconomics misalignments, and 
consequently central banks will often intervene in the official market to eliminate the 
spread – hence the importance of investigating whether there exists a long-run 
relationship between black market and official exchange rates. This is also crucial to 
establishing whether or not the black market processes information efficiently, i.e. 
whether investors use information contained in the black market rate to predict 
movements in the official rate. The implications are extremely important not only for 
policy-makers but also for financial managers investing in emerging markets and 
managing the exchange rate risk. In addition to the long-run equilibrium, it is also 
interesting to analyse the short-run speed of adjustment of the two types of exchange 
rates in response to external shocks.  
In this paper, we use both time series and heterogeneous panel cointegration 
tests to test for the existence of a long-run relationship between the black market and 
the official exchange rate in six emerging countries (i.e., Iran, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Pakistan, and Thailand). Moreover, we impose the unity (proportionality) restriction 
on the cointegrating coefficient, consistently with portfolio-balance models (see, e.g., 
Dornbusch et al, 1983), and test its validity by carrying out a Wald test in a panel 
context. Finally, we investigate the short-run dynamics by estimating impulse 
response functions using bootstrap methods.  
The layout of the paper is the following. Section 2 outlines the econometric 
methodology. Section 3 describes the data and presents the empirical results. Section 
4 summarises the main findings and provides an economic interpretation. 
 
2. Econometric Methodology 
Let and be the log of the black market and of the official exchange rate, 
respectively, in country i . To take into account heterogeneity, we apply the 
McCoskey and Kao (1998) panel cointegration test by specifying the following DOLS 
(Dynamic OLS – see Stock and Watson, 1993) regression equation: 
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The number of leads and lags in equation (1) is chosen with the Akaike criterion. In 
the presence of significant autocorrelation, even with high orders of leads and lags, 
one should instead employ the DGLS (Dynamic Generalised Least Squares – see 
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McCoskey and Kao, 1998) estimation method, together with the Newey and West 
(1994) HAC (heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) covariance estimator, 
as we do below (see Section 3). 
The method introduced by McCoskey and Kao (1998) involves a residual-
based Lagrange Multiplier test for the null hypothesis of cointegration in panel data. 
This test is a panel version of the Harris and Inder (1994) cointegration test for time 
series. McCoskey and Kao (1998) show that the standardised version of the LM 
statistic is given by: 
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where  and vu vσ  are obtained by Monte Carlo simulation methods (see Table 1, 
McCoskey and Kao, 1998). 
 We also analyse the short-run dynamic adjustment of exchange rates to 
external shocks by estimating impulse response functions Let be a 
discrete time real valued vector stochastic process, and assume it follows the 
following Vector Autoregressive model of order ; : 
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where is a tu 1×p vector of error terms having a martingale specification with 
covariance matrix Ω . 
 In a more compact form (3) can be written as follows: 
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where , with being a lag operator. pp LLLL Π−−Π−Π−Π≡Π ...)( 2210 L
 A Vector Moving Average (VMA) representation of (3) is: 
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where ; , and is a polynomial matrix 
generally of infinite order. 
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Let ikl ,φ be the response of the variable to a standard deviation shock on the 
variable , periods ahead, and define as 
k
l i ,]',...,[ 2,1 pΠΠΠ=ϕ  a vector that stacks the 
parameters of the system in (3). Impulse responses are obtained by inverting the 
polynomial (3), therefore ikl ,φ  is a non-linear function of 'ϕ such that )(, ϕφ ikl . 
Because of its non-linearity, in small samples ikl ,φ  can be biased, with the bias 
increasing with the length of the horizon. For this reason, confidence intervals should 
also be constructed. Different methods have been suggested. In this paper we follow 
Kilian (1999) and adopt a residual-based resampling method (i.e. a semi-parametric 
one). 
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3. Empirical Analysis 
We use monthly data on black market and official exchange rates for six emerging 
market economies, namely Iran, India, Indonesia, Korea, Pakistan and Thailand, for 
the period 1973M1-1998M1. The former series are obtained from Pick`s World 
Currency Yearbook (various issues). In this respect, our study differs from earlier 
ones focusing on individual countries (see, e.g., Booth and Mustafa, 1991), or using 
annual data covering a shorter period (see, e.g., Bahmani-Oskooee et al, 2002) 
 Table 1 shows the average black-market premium for the six exchange rates 
being analysed. As can be seen, it is positive for all countries and sizeable in the case 
of Iran and Indonesia, whilst it is rather small for Thailand. 
 
         Average Black-Market Premium (ABMP) 1973-1998 
Country  ABMP ANormalized ABMP  
Iran 1030.65 6.62  
India 1.90463 0.139  
Indonesia 106.664 0.056  
Korea 28.5987 0.046  
Pakistan 2.21215 0.151  
Thailand 0.05759 0.0014  
Table 1 
Note: the Normalized ABMP has been obtained by dividing the black 
market premium by the official exchange rate.  
 
We then apply panel unit root tests to test for stationarity of the black market and 
official exchange rates. Taylor and Sarno (1998) propose a panel unit root test for the 
joint null hypothesis of nonstationarity The test is based on the Johansen maximum 
likelihood method for multivariate cointegration, where the null hypothesis is that at 
least one of the series in the panel has a unit root, H0: rank (Π) < N. The null is rejected 
if and only if all the series in the panel are stationary processes, i.e. H1: rank(Π) = N, 
where the matrix Π denotes the long-run solution of the VAR system for N variables. 
This is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis that the smallest eigenvalue of Π, λmin, is 
non-zero, which is done using Johansen's likelihood ratio statistic (JLR),  
 
 
)1ln( minλ−−= TJLR      
  
 
Taylor and Sarno (1998) show that the JLR statistic has a limiting χ2(1) distribution 
under the null hypothesis. The results of the JLR test are reported in Table 2, and 
confirm that both types of exchange rates are processes, as usually found in the 
empirical literature. 
)1(I
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Taylor and Sarno (1998) JLR Panel Unit Root Test 
 JLR statistic 
ts  0.110556 
*
ts  0.123574 
       Table 2 
        Note: The 5% critical value is 3.9712 (Taylor and Sarno, 1998, Table 3). 
 
 
 
Next, we test for cointegration between the two exchange rates. As pointed out 
by Booth and Mustafa (1991), the existence of cointegration is inconsistent with the 
efficient market hypothesis, which implies that past information on the exchange rate 
cannot be exploited to forecast future values: a feedback from one market to the other 
would constitute evidence of weak-form informational inefficiency in the black 
market.  
 
McCoskey and Kao (1998) Panel Cointegration Test  
Country Leads/Lags AR(ρ) Pr[Fa] Harris and Inder 
CointegrationTest 
Iran 1 1 12.15 0.0787 
India 2 1 10.39 0.1286 
Indonesia 7 2 6.77 0.1506 
Korea 8 2 15.58 0.2921 
Pakistan 1 1 8.88 0.1313 
Thailand 7 1 14.35 0.3689 
McCoskey-Kao panel test 
(LM*) 
  0.56 
CV-5%    1.64 
Table 3 
Note: (a) The critical values for the Harris and Inder cointegration test (for 
time series with 1 regressor) are: 1%=0.5497; 5%=0.3202 (Harris and Inder, 1994, 
Table 1). (b) The LM* test is one-sided with a critical value of 1.64 (i.e. LM*>1.64 
implies rejection of the null hypothesis of cointegration).  
 (c) Pr[Fa] is the probability value of an F0 version of the Breusch-Godfrey 
test for 9th order autocorrelation. AR(ρ) denotes the order of the autoregressive  
scheme employed in the model. 
 
Table 3 reports two cointegration tests, specifically the McCoskey and Kao 
(1998) panel cointegration test, and the univariate cointegration tests due to Harris 
and Inder (1994), which is a time series version of it. Looking at the individual 
cointegration tests, we note that there is evidence of cointegration in all countries. The 
panel cointegration test also confirms that there exists a long-run relationship between 
the two exchange rates, and that therefore the black market cannot be characterised as 
efficient. 
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 Table 4 presents DGLS estimates of the cointegrating vector. As can be seen, 
all the coefficients are statistically significant (at least at the 10% confidence level), 
with the exception of the intercept for Thailand. 
A useful framework to provide an economic interpretation of the relationship 
between the two types of exchange rates is the portfolio-balance class of models (see, 
e.g., Dornbusch et al, 1983). This asserts that asset market conditions determine the 
black market rate, and the current account affects it through the stock of black-market 
foreign currency. Consequently, there is a proportional equilibrium relationship 
between the two rates, which implies that the long-run parameter β  should be equal 
to unity, resulting in a constant black-market premium. In the short run, the black 
market rate overshoots, as the supply of foreign currency is fixed, i.e. the premium 
falls as a result of an unanticipated devaluation; however, in the long run changes in 
the black market rate affect the current account and the stock of foreign currency, 
which eventually results in a proportional change in the black market rate, with the 
premium reverting to its long-run value. We test for this long-run restriction (i.e. the 
proportionality restriction) by means of a Wald test (see Table 4).  
 
                DGLS Estimates (Equation 1) 
 
Country 
α β β=1 
[χ2(1)] 
Iran 13.29 
[1.13] 
0.02 
[2.06] 
 
20.50 
India 0.312 
[7.54] 
0.93 
[65.7] 
 
19.45 
Indonesia -0.30 
[-1.74] 
1.01 
[40.57] 
 
3.96 
Korea 1.16 [2.12] 
0.83 
[9.84] 4.19 
Pakistan 0.463 
[3.62] 
0.89 
[20.28] 
 
6.91 
Thailand -0.120 [-0.87] 
1.03 
[23.37] 0.76 
PLR   55.77 
CV-1%   16.81 
CV-5%   12.59 
Table 4 
Note: Numbers in parentheses below the regression coefficients are t-values. χ2(1) is 
the Wald test for the proportionality restriction, H0:β=1 (5% CV=3.84). PLR is the 
corresponding panel likelihood ratio statistic that follows a χ2(v) distribution with 
N(=6) d.f . 
 
As in Cerrato and Sarantis (2003), we also extend this test to a panel context.  
The null hypothesis of a valid restriction is accepted in the case of Thailand and 
marginally rejected for Indonesia, whilst it is strongly rejected in all the other cases. 
The panel test confirms that the proportionality restriction cannot be accepted for the 
six countries under investigation. This result would suggest that foreign exchange 
controls could have a long-run impact, with the black market rate deviating from the 
official one. By contrast, Bahmani-Oskooee et al (2002) state in their study that in the 
long run full adjustment takes place. Note, however, that these authors base their 
claim simply on point estimates (close to one) of the long-run slope coefficient, 
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without carrying out any statistical tests of the relevant restriction, which, instead, we 
do. 1  
 On the basis of these findings, we can conclude that black market and official 
exchange rates are linked in the long run (which casts doubt on their informational 
efficiency), though the panel evidence also indicates that the black-market premium is 
unlikely to disappear even in the long run, and hence foreign exchange policies might 
be effective. 
 Finally, we investigate the short-run dynamic adjustment between the two 
types of exchange rates. Figures 1-6 show impulse responses to a unit standard 
deviation shock to either exchange rate. The empirical results appear to confirm the 
positive significant impact of the official exchange rate on the black market exchange 
rate. Furthermore, they are consistent with the sign of the β -coefficient estimated by 
DGLS. 
We also examine the response of each exchange rate to shocks to the same 
market. These show that both the official and the black market exchange rates are 
highly persistent processes2. However, in general, the speed of response to a unit 
standard deviation shock seems to be higher for the black market exchange rate 
compared to the official one. 
On the whole, we observe the short-run overshooting predicted by portfolio-
balance models. However, we also find that, even after forty months, the effects of 
shocks have not died away, which is inconsistent with the long-run full adjustment 
implied by this class of models.3 It would appear, therefore, that the long-run black-
market premium is not constant, or, at least, that deviations from the long-run 
equilibrium are long-lived, with long memory characterising these processes (see 
Granger and Joyeux, 1980). 
 
                
 
Figure 1: Iran; BR and OR are respectively black market and 
official market exchange rates. 
 
                                                          
1 Some single-country studies test formally the long-run proportionality restriction, and cannot reject it 
(see, e.g., Kouretas and Zarangas, 2001). 
2 We tested for stationarity of the individual exchange rates and found that, with the exception of 
Korea, they were all non-stationary. This might explain their persistence as shown by the impulse 
response function. 
3 This result is consistent with Cerrato and Sarantis (2004), who found point estimates of half-lives 
deviation of the exchange rate from PPP ranging, for some of these countries, between 0.22 years and 
infinity, while the upper bounds of the confidence intervals were in all cases infinite. 
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Figure 2: India; BR and OR are respectively black market and 
official market exchange rates. 
 
 
Figure 3: Indonesia; BR and OR are respectively black market and 
official market exchange rates. 
 
 
Figure 4: Korea; BR and OR are respectively black market and 
official market exchange rates. 
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Figure 5: Pakistan; BR and OR are respectively black market and 
official market exchange rates. 
 
 
Figure 6: Thailand; BR and OR are respectively black market and 
official market exchange rates. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper provides further empirical evidence on the relationship between black 
market and official exchange rates in six emerging economies (Iran, India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Pakistan, and Thailand). First, it applies both time series techniques and 
heterogeneous panel methods to test for the existence of a long-run relation between 
these two types of exchange rates. Second, it tests formally the validity of the 
proportionality restriction implying a constant black-market premium (unlike other 
studies, such as Bahmani-Oskooee et al, 2002, only reporting point estimates). Third, 
in addition to the long-run equilibrium, it also analyses the short-run dynamic 
responses of both markets to shocks. Our empirical analysis suggests that black 
market and official rates are linked in the long run. This points to weak-form 
informational inefficiency (see Booth and Mustafa, 1991), which might reflect the 
existence of transaction costs and/or foreign exchange controls. However, unlike other 
authors (e.g., Kouretas and Zarangas, 2001), we also find that the proportionality 
restriction, which is an essential feature of portfolio-balance models (see Dornbusch 
et al, 1983), is rejected, indicating that the adjustment towards equilibrium in response 
to short-run shocks is incomplete. Partial reversion to the long-run equilibrium (or 
possibly the presence of long-memory features) is confirmed by the short-run 
analysis, showing that the initial overshooting does not totally fade away. 
These results have important implication for both fund managers and policy-
makers. Market inefficiency (and hence the possibility of international arbitrage) 
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s that the former can reduce exchange rate risk knowing that fluctuations in 
the black market rate signal corresponding adjustments in the official rate However, 
the exchange rate risk cannot be eliminated altogether, as full adjustment does not 
take place (or is extremely slow), and a widening gap between the two exchange rates 
is only partially closed (at least over a relevant investment horizon). Permanent (or 
long-lived) deviations from equilibrium also imply that monetary authorities can 
effectively pursue their policy objectives by imposing foreign exchange or direct 
controls (see Kiguel and O’Connell, 1995), not having to adjust the official rate to the 
market-determined parallel one in order to close the gap between the two (at least for 
a considerable time) – a crucial policy implication. This is in stark contrast to the 
study of Bahmani-Oskooee et al (2002), where proportionality is not formally tested. 
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